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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-DESIGNATION
OF COUNSEL-COMPULSORY APPOINTMENT IN CIVIL CASE-The
United States Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
does not authorize a federal court to make compulsory assignments
of attorneys to represent indigent litigants in a civil case.
Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Southern Dist. of Iowa,
U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989).
In February of 1986, the Iowa State Bar Association and the Le-
gal Services Corporation of Iowa created the Volunteer Lawyers
Project (hereinafter VLP), pursuant to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeal's decision in Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing.'
Under the system instituted by the District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa, the VLP nonalphabetically selected lawyers who
had not volunteered for assignment of pro bono state court cases
from a roster compiled by the District Court of all attorneys ad-
mitted to practice who were in good standing.2 The District Court's
authority to provide for such appointment in proceedings in forma
pauperis was conferred by federal statute.3
In June of 1987, attorney John H. Mallard was selected by the
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa's VLP to represent
several indigent inmates in an action against prison officials and
administrators under Title 42 of the United States Code, Section
1983." Mallard, admitted to practice before the District Court only
1. 728 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1984). In Nelson, the Court of Appeals found "it incumbent
upon the chief judge of each district to seek the cooperation of the bar associations and
federal practice committees of the judge's district to obtain a sufficient list of attorneys
practicing throughout the district so as to supply the court with competent attorneys who
will serve in pro bono situations . . ." Id. at 1005.
2. 109 S. Ct. 1816 (1989). The VLP provides that lawyers serving under the program
may be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses and may receive any fee awards provided for
by statute; however, there is no assurance of even minimal compensation for acceptance of a
VLP assignment. Id at 1817.
3. Id. at 1816. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1892) provides: "The court may request an attor-
ney to represent any such person [claiming in forma pauperis status] unable to employ
counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that
the action is frivolous or malicious." Id.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979). Section 1983 authorizes a United States citizen or person
under United States jurisdiction to sue for deprivation of any rights, privileges or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution. The inmates in Mallard's pro bono assignment alleged that
prison officials had filed false disciplinary reports against them, physically mistreated them,
and subjected them to life-threatening circumstances by exposing them as informants. See
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five months earlier, filed a motion to withdraw with the District
Court. Mallard stated in his motion to withdraw that upon re-
viewing the file, he concluded that his lack of experience in depos-
ing and cross-examining witnesses and his unfamiliarity with the
legal issues involved in the action rendered him incompetent to lit-
igate the matter and that he would willingly volunteer to serve in
an area of the law in which he was proficient.'
The VLP opposed the motion, stating that not only was Mallard
qualified to serve, but also that it was his ethical duty to serve, and
that allowing him to withdraw would be an exception to the assign-
ment rule which would set a "dangerous precedent."7
Mallard's motion to withdraw was denied by a Magistrate,
whereupon he appealed to the District Court, again asserting his
unfamiliarity with Section 1983 actions and further contending
that because he was not trained as a litigator, his acceptance of
such a case constituted a violation of his ethical obligation to only
accept cases he is able to handle competently.' He concluded that
the district court, in disallowing his withdrawal, would be exceed-
ing its authority under Section 1915(d) of Title 28.1 In an accom-
panying affidavit, Mallard also asserted that he did not enjoy the
role of litigator, and because of this reluctance, would not be capa-
ble of rendering effective assistance. 10 The district court held that
Mallard was competent, and upheld the Magistrate's decision, rul-
ing that Section 1915(d) authorizes federal courts to make compul-
sory assignments of counsel in civil actions.11
Mallard then sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit which would compel the district court
to allow his withdrawal; the appellate court, however, denied his
petition without opinion. 2 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide the question over which the lower
courts were in conflict: whether Title 28 of the United States Code,
109 S. Ct. at 1817.
5. 109 S. Ct. 1817.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 109 S. Ct. at 1817. Based on the quality of Mallard's brief in support of his motion
to withdraw, however, the District Court pronounced him competent. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The United States Supreme Court noted in the majority opinion, however, the
existence of periodic seminars held by the VLP, as well as the availability of written materi-
als and consultations with experienced attorneys regarding attorneys assigned to litigate
matters with which they lack familiarity were available. Id.
11. Id.
12. 109 S. Ct. at 1817.
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Section 1915(d) authorized a federal court to make compulsory as-
signments of attorneys who were unwilling to represent indigent
litigants in civil cases. 3
The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, answered
this question in the negative.14 In the majority opinion,15 delivered
by Justice Brennan, Section 1915(d) was analyzed by interpreta-
tion of its operative term, "request." '16 The Court opined that be-
cause "request" was employed as a verb in Section 1915(d), its col-
loquial connotation was not synonymous with a "command" or
"demand," as it is when employed as a noun. The Court con-
cluded that the refusal of a request was generally understood not
to carry the consequence of punishment or sanction; therefore, the
non-compulsory implication of the word request, as employed in
the statute, was evident. 8
Comparing Section 1915(d) to Section 1915(c), which was
adopted simultaneously, the Court decided that the use of the
word "shall" in addressing the duties of court officers and wit-
nesses in Section 1915(c) demonstrated that "Congress knew how
to require service when it deemed compulsory service appropriate
S. .,,;19 therefore, merely "requesting" counsel to service evinces
an intent that this service should be non-compulsory.2 °
Examining state statutes providing for "assignment" or "ap-
pointment" of counsel which were already in effect at the time
Section 1915 was adopted,2 the Court reasoned that since Con-
gress was aware of the existence of such stringent practices and
still chose to employ the word "request," Congress intended to per-
mit attorneys to decline representation of indigent litigants.2
Vague precedent from the state courts and from English com-
13. Id.
14. 109 S. Ct. 1816.
15. Id. at 1816-1823. Justice Brennan's majority opinion was joined by Rehnquist, C.
J., & Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Steven's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor. Id. at 1816.
16. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1026
(1989), slip op. at 5 and Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), regarding
the use of language employed in a statute as the starting point in statutory interpretation.
17. 109 S. Ct. at 1818.
18. Id.
19. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) provides: "The officers of the court shall issue and serve all
process . . . Witnesses shall attend as in other cases . .Id. (Emphasis added).
20. Id.
21. 109 S. Ct. at 1818-19.
22. 109 S. Ct. at 1819.
1990
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mon law pertaining to the question of whether attorneys could de-
cline representation and not be subject to court sanctioning led the
Court to espouse Professor Shapiro's conclusion"3 that [t]o justify
coerced, uncompensated legal services on the basis of a firm tradi-
tion in England and the United States is "to read into that tradi-
tion a story that is not there." '24
A comparison of Section 1915(d) with prior federal statutes au-
thorizing court-ordered representation of indigent litigants"' fur-
ther supported the Court's conclusion that the subsequent adop-
tion of Section 1915(d) without use of the verb "assign" evinces
the deliberate intent of Congress to depart from compulsory as-
signment when fashioning Section 1915(d).26 Furthermore, the ac-
tions of Congress subsequent to the enactment of Section 1915(d)
in adopting federal statutes which did employ the word "assign" or
"appoint," in addressing the authority of courts to compel repre-
sentation of the indigent,2" signified that Section 1915(d) was not
intended to compel coercive representation, according to the
Court.28
The Court finally addressed the District Court's contention that
construing Section 1915(d) as permitting attorneys to decline a
court's request for representation in pro bono proceedings would
render the section a nullity. The Court reasoned that since statutes
often are the mere codification of an existing power, Section
1915(d)'s role was one of formally legitimizing the court's request
as appropriate.2"
Regarding the second issue of whether petitioner Mallard had
discharged his burden of proving that he was entitled to a writ of
mandamus, the Court employed the traditional standard in deter-
mining eligibility for this extraordinary remedy.30 The Court first
inquired whether the District Court had acted beyond its jurisdic-
23. See Shapiro, The Enigma of a Lawyer's Duty to Serve,
55 N.Y.U.L. REv. 735, 749-762 (1980).
24. 109 S. Ct. at 1819, (citing Shapiro, The Enigma of a Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55
N.Y.U.L. REv. 735, at 753.) Id.
25. Id. at 1820. The Court uses 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1948), which provides for "assign-
ment" of counsel for capital defendants in criminal cases, as an illustration of such use of
the verb "assign" in authorizing court-ordered appointment of counsel. Id.
26. Id.
27. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A; 18 U.S.C. § 3503(c); 18 U.S.C. § 4109; 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b);
42 U.S.C. § 1971(f); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 3413(1); 10
U.S.C. § 827.
28. 109 S. Ct. at 1821.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1822.
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tion. The majority concluded that Mallard was indeed invoking the
traditional use of the writ by alleging that the district court did
not lawfully exercise its prescribed authority in appointing him,
thus constituting a "clear abuse of discretion."3 ' The Court's next
inquiry was whether petitioner Mallard lacked an adequate alter-
native remedy.32 Because Mallard had no other available remedy,
the Court concluded that he had met his burden of showing that
his right to the writ was indeed "clear and indisputable."33 Finally,
the Court inquired whether any of the principal reasons for reluc-
tance to issue the writ were present.3 4 Because the district court
Judge was not a party to the action, the undesirable element of
making-a judge a litigant did not exist in the present action.3 5 Fur-
thermore, because petitioner Mallard had not severed any ele-
ments of the merits litigation, there was no danger of creating inef-
ficient "piecemeal appellate litigation."3" Therefore, the Court
concluded that Mallard had met his burden of proof regarding his
entitlement to the writ of mandamus, and it was error for the
Court of Appeals to deny his application.37
The Court declined to address respondent's contention that the
federal courts possess inherent authority to require attorneys to
serve, as neither court below invoked such authority as grounds for
their decisions.38 Thus, it was held that Section 1915(d) did not
authorize federal courts to make coercive appointments of counsel
in proceedings in forma pauperis, and the Court reversed the judg-
31. Id. See Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953), and De
Beer's Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945), regarding abuse
of discretion as a standard of review. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. See Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976), Allied
Chemical Corporation v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980).
34. 109 S. Ct. at 1822. See Kerr, 426 U.S. at 402-403; Allied Chemical Corp., 449 U.S.
at 35, for further discussion concerning reluctance to condone the use of this extraordinary
remedy.
35. Id.
36. See Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403. Since the Judiciary Act of 1789 Congress has deter-
mined that generally, appellate review should be postponed until the trial court has ren-
dered final judgment. "[J]udicial readiness to issue the writ of mandamus in anything less
than an extraordinary situation would run the real risk of defeating the very policies sought
to be furthered by that judgment of Congress." Id.
37. 109 S. Ct. at 1822.
38. Id. at 1823. See generally Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987), for the pro-
position that a federal district court has discretion to adopt local rules that are necessary to
carry on its business and that the United States Supreme Court may exercise its inherent
supervisory authority to ensure consistency of local rules with "principles of right and jus-




ment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the lower
court.S9
Justice Kennedy joined in full the opinion of the Court in a con-
curring opinion which stated that the majority had only dealt with
the interpretation of a statute, not with determining the profes-
sional responsibility of a lawyer.4 Kennedy concluded that some
professional obligations may exceed obligations to the state; ac-
cepting a court's request to represent the indigent was an example
of such an obligation.41 The majority opinion, he stated, did not
suggest otherwise.2
Justice Stevens dissented, emphasizing in his opinion that the
paramount issue involved was neither the plain meaning of "re-
quest" in Section 1915(d), nor whether an attorney's reasons for
refusing such "requests" were sufficient, nor even whether sanc-
tions may be imposed for such refusals.4" The real question in-
volved, the Justice stated, was "whether a lawyer may seek relief
by way of mandamus from the court's request simply because he
would rather do something else with his time.
44 Both precedent 45
and tradition 46 were cited to support the premise that a court's
authority to define the terms and conditions upon which an attor-
ney may be admitted to the bar gave it the power to require law-
yers to serve.47
Section 1915(d) was interpreted by the dissenters as being
adopted for the specific purpose of granting federal courts the
39. 109 S. Ct. at 1823.
40. Id.
41. Id. The Justice remarked that an attorney's duties go beyond what the law de-




45. Id. at 1824. See Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); United States v. Hvass, 355
U.S. 570 (1958); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 821
(1987); Sparks v. Parker, 368 So.2d 528, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 803 (1979); Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 287 (1985); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin,
248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928); Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 61, 63 (1860);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932), which address the subject of bar membership as a
privilege which carries with it duties and obligations. Id.
46. Id. See E. BROWN, LAWYERS AND THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE 253-254 1938); H.
DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 62-63 (1963); R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 100 (1967), regarding
inherent power of the court to assign attorneys and the implied professional duty of the
lawyer, as agent of the court, to serve. Id.
47. Id. See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
976 (1966), cited in Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 (1973), regarding the duty
to serve as a condition to licensing to practice. Id.
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same authority of appointment already possessed by the state
courts.48 Therefore, Section 1915(d) must be construed as requiring
counsel to serve as requested, in order to give effect to the legisla-
ture's intent. 9
The dissent attached no significance to the difference between
the plain meaning of "request," as used in Section 1915(d), and
"assign" or "appoint," as used in contemporary state statutes."
The title of the statute, originally introduced to the House and
Senate as "[an Act providing when plaintiff may sue as a poor
person and when counsel shall be assigned by the court," evinces
legislative intent that the appointment of counsel be compulsory.
5 1
Addressing the issue of petitioner Mallard's entitlement to a writ
of mandamus, the dissent stated that petitioner's right to have his
motion to withdraw granted by the district court was by no means
absolute, because the court's interest in adequate representation of
a litigant and in orderly prosecution of a lawsuit outweigh the at-
torney's interest in terminating a client relationship.52 The dissent
attached significance to the fact that petitioner had filed his mo-
tion to withdraw before he had even entered an appearance, this
fact being evidence that he recognized a duty to accept the ap-
pointment and therefore felt it appropriate to petition the Magis-
trate to allow his withdrawal.5
Finally, the dissent examined respondent's contention that a
construction of Section 1915(d) as non-compulsory renders the
statute a nullity, deciding that "request" indeed meant "respect-
fully command" in Section 1915(d), and that to construe Congress'
intent as otherwise would indeed render the statute meaningless.54
No evidence in history, the dissenters concluded, supported the
majority's proposition that Section 1915(d) was merely codifying
an existing authority of the court in order to legitimize such re-
quests as appropriate. 55
Twenty Eight (28) U.S.C. Section 1915 is based on the Act of
48. Id. at 1825.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1826. See 23 CONG. REc. 5199, 6264 (1892).
52. Id. The dissent cited Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 802 F.2d 676 (3rd Cir.
1986) and Mekdeci ex rel. Mekdici v. Merrell National Laboratories, 711 F.2d 1510, 1521-
1522 (11th Cir. 1983) as examples of the balancing of the interests of the court and the
attorney. Id.





July 20, 1892, c.209, Sections 1 to 5. e Despite subsequent revisions
and amendments, 57 the word "request" has been retained and ap-
pears in the current Section 1915(d), which bears minimal differ-
ence from the original wording of the 1892 Act. 8 Whether such a
"request" is compulsory on the part of the attorney assigned is not
expressly addressed in this section. The sole reference to compul-
sory service was made in a short floor debate in the House, yet no
conclusive opinion was expressed as dispositive of the issue. 9
It appears that Section 1915(d), although now applicable to civil
and criminal proceedings, was originally drafted as applying only
to suits commenced by the indigent (i.e., proceedings initiated by a
civil plaintiff, since a private individual may not commence a crim-
inal prosecution).60
Tradition in the English Courts and the history of colonial
America do not supply evidence of the existence of any require-
ment of compulsory representation of indigent plaintiffs in a civil
action prior to the enactment of the 1892 Act which is presently
Section 1915(d). 1 English history reveals the existence of a stat-
ute, entitled "an Act to admit such persons as are poor to sue in
forma pauperis," enacted in 1495 and replaced by court rules in
1883,62 but its provisions were inapplicable to a civil defendant,
and a civil plaintiff had to establish the fact of his indigence and
submit a certificate of counsel showing good cause for his suit.
6 3
56. 27 Stat. 252. The 1892 Act was entitled "An Act providing when plaintiff may sue
as a poor person and when counsel shall be assigned by the court." Section 4 is the corre-
sponding portion pertaining to the appointment of counsel, provided for currently in 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
57. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915, for historical and
revision notes pertaining to all sections of 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
58. Compare Act July 20, 1892 c.209, § 4 with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The original Act
provides "[tihat the court may request any attorney of the court to represent such poor
person, if it deems the cause worthy of a trial, and may dismiss any such cause so brought
under this act if it be made to appear that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if said
court be satisfied that the alleged cause of action is frivolous or malicious." The current §
1915(d) reads: "The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to
employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied
that the action is frivolous or malicious."
59. 23 CONG. REc. 5199 (1892).
60. 109 S. Ct. at 1820, n.5. The House Report refers solely to property disputes and
the floor debate in the House mentions only indigent civil plaintiffs. See H.R. Rep. at No.
1079, 52nd Cong. 1st Sess., 1 (1892), and 23 CONG. REc. 5199 (1892).
61. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.L. REv. 735, 739-
753 (1980).
62. Id. at 741, (citing 11 Hen. 7, c.12 (1495)).
63. Id. at 745-46. It is difficult to determine the frequency with which the English
courts actually exercised this statutory power of appointment. Serjeants-at-law, however,
Vol. 28:851
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Assignment in criminal cases was made only in cases of treason
after 1688, and finally in respect of felonies generally in 1836.64 Fi-
nally, in 1695, an attorney's obligation to serve upon court assign-
ment was given limited statutory recognition by virtue of a statute
which required the courts to appoint counsel upon the request of
criminal defendants charged with treason. 5 By the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, the procedure of appointive counsel had reached the
point of "being worth 'little or nothing'" in the English system,
which again underwent reform in the twentieth century to estab-
lish an entirely voluntary appointive system."
American history is replete with both statutory and case law per-
taining to the appointment of counsel in a criminal proceeding.
67
However, record of the extent to which such appointments were
deemed compulsory was incomplete and record of the frequency
were generally expected to undertake such appointments when asked to by the court be-
cauise of their elite reputation in the legal community and the public nature of their office.
Thus, the English courts never squarely confronted the issue of whether an attorney could
be compelled into representing an indigent civil litigant. Id.
64. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932).
65. U.S. v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 at 636-37 (9th Cir. 1965), (citing 7 and 8 W.3, C.3, S.1
(1695)).
66. Brooks v. Central Bank of Birmingham, Civil Action No. 81-G-1303-S (N.D. Ala-
bama, S.D. June 14, 1982) (WL Allfeds library, Dist file).
67. See Shapiro, The Enigma of a Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.L. REv. 735, 750-
756 (1980). Prior and subsequent to the American Revolution, the Colonies exhibited varia-
tion in their treatment of the right to counsel in criminal cases. Shapiro acknowledges three
basic approaches: adhering closely to English practice recognizing a broader right to counsel
than observed in England, and providing for assignment of counsel in cases of serious or
capital crimes.
Among those states who rejected the English rule in force until 1836 (i.e., in felonies the
court itself was counsel for the prisoner) and granted a constitutional right to counsel in all
criminal proceedings were: Maryland, Massachusetts, N. Hampshire, N. York, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, N. Jersey, Connecticut and Georgia. While the constitutions of North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia and Rhode Island did not originally recognize a right to counsel in
criminal proceedings, provision was made for such representation by statute. See Powell,
287 U.S. 45, 61-65 (1932).
In addition, Pennsylvania and Delaware and New Jersey recognized the obligation of
counsel to represent indigents upon court order by statutes enacted in 1718, 1709, and 1731,
respectively. See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 1965), and Sparks v.
Parker, 368 So.2d 528, 532 (1979). Following the American Revolution, New Jersey again
gave statutory recognition of the right to counsel in all cases of indictment (1795); federal
statutory recognition of the obligation of counsel to serve in cases of treason and other capi-
tal crimes occurred in 1790. 1 Stat. 118 (1790). See U.S. v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 637 (9th Cir.
1965), and Sparks v. Parker, 368 So.2d 528, 532 (1979).
The 1790 federal statute is presently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1976), which the Mal-
lard Court declined to address regarding "whether, or under what conditions, (such a fed-
eral statute) providing for the 'assignment' or 'appointment' of counsel authorizes federal
courts to compel an unwilling attorney to render service." See Malard 109 S. Ct. 1820.
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with which attorneys' refusals to accept appointment met with dis-
ciplinary action was nonexistent.6 8 The United States Supreme
Court has never specifically addressed the issue of whether com-
pelled service in a civil pro bono case is constitutional, 9 but had
intimated in several opinions that an attorney may, by virtue of his
profession, possess a unique duty to serve in such situations."'
More recently, the related issue of whether a United States dis-
trict court has the power to appoint counsel to file a civil suit for a
plaintiff arose in Brooks v. Central Bank of Birmingham,71 ena-
bling the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama to discuss the constitutionality of compelling an attorney
to represent a civil litigant.72 The Brooks court, relying on In the
Matter of Nine Applications for Appointments of Counsel in Ti-
tle VII Proceedings,7 3 held that the relevant statute providing for
such appointment was unconstitutional and that therefore the dis-
trict court lacked the power to appoint counsel to file a civil suit
for a plaintiff. The court referred to its prior determination 4 that
such appointment was compulsory under the statute because of
both the clarity of legislative history and the use of the word "ap-
point" rather than "request, ' 75 and then addressed the application
68. Shapiro, The Enigma of a Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. at 751, 755-
56. There are numerous cases, however, regarding a lawyer's claim to compensation beyond
the statutorily authorized amount after completion of a pro bono assignment. Id.
69. Id at 757.
70. Id. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S.
578 (1973); Sparks v. Parker, 444 U.S. 803 (1979).
Powell acknowledged the power of the trial court, even absent a statute, to appoint an
attorney for the accused in a capital case and viewed the attorney as an officer of the court
who was bound to serve when the appointment required such service.
Hurtado involved the validity of a federal law which provided that material witnesses who
were unable to give bail may be incarcerated and paid a dollar a day, before trial. The Court
there also discussed the obligation of the attorney, as court officer, to serve without
compensation.
Sparks involved the constitutionality of a Seventh Judicial Circuit order which estab-
lished an indigent defense system providing for appointment in criminal cases, and reiter-
ated the notion of the attorney's unique duty, as officer of the court, to render service with-
out compensation.
71. Civil Action No. 81-G-1303-S (N.D. Alabama, S.D. June 14, 1982) (WL Allfeds
library, Dist file).
72. Id. The statute involved in Brooks was 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(1), which provides
for the appointment of counsel for a Title VII Complainant. Counsel in Brooks sought rede-
termination of an order denying his motion to withdraw as appointed counsel for the plain-
tiff in a Title VII action. Id.
73. 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
74. Id.
75. Civil Action No. 81-G-1303-S (N.D. Alabama, S.D. June 14, 1982) (WL Allfeds
library, Dist file). The court compared 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) in
860
1990 Recent Decisions 861
of the Thirteenth Amendment's provision prohibiting involuntary
servitude to the appointment in question. 6 The court reasoned
that if the meaning of involuntary servitude were limited to a nar-
row interpretation including only chattel slavery, then the Amend-
ment's exclusion of situations such as the forced labor of a con-
victed criminal would be superfluous." The court deduced three
propositions from previous United States Supreme Court deci-
sions 7 and concluded that continuance of service under a contract
of personal service, when compelled under statute, amounts to in-
voluntary servitude.7 9 The argument that the lawyer's duty to re-
present a Title VII complainant was analogous to other limited
public service obligations was rejected by-the court, which distin-
guished between the obligation to represent a criminal defendant
and the representation of a private plaintiff in a civil case."0 Con-
ceding that such an obligation to represent an indigent client ex-
isted in a criminal proceeding but not in proceedings initiated by a
private plaintiff, the court granted counsel's motion to withdraw. 1
Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph Printing82 involved the issue of
whether failure to appoint counsel for a civil plaintiff was abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court and addressed the standard
regarding the showing which must be made in order for counsel to
be appointed under Section 1915(d).8 3 The court held that there
making the distinction between a compulsory appointment and a request to serve.
76. Id.
77. Id. "Ex hypothesi, such forced labor would not be involuntary servitude anyway,
so why make it an exception?" The court cited a famous law review article regarding invol-
untary servitude and the reasons generally employed in denying specific performance of per-
sonal service contracts. See Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction, 6 CORNELL L.Q.
235, 244-45, 247-50, 255 (1921). Id.
78. Id. The propositions are that a contract of service from which the law permits no
release except by performance amounts to involuntary servitude; when continuance of such
service is compelled by and punishable under statue, such service is involuntary servitude;
such continued service is no less involuntary servitude merely because the contract was en-
tered into voluntarily. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The court noted that compulsory appointment of counsel for indigent criminal
defendants has been sustained as an exception to the Thirteenth Amendment, but that "for
the legislature to compel an attorney to work by passing a statute requiring the judge to
order it" would be to take the attorney's property without just compensation. Id.
81. Id.
82. 728 F.2d 1003 (8th Cir. 1984). It was in response to this decision that the VLP,
through which Mallard's name was selected for appointment, was established. Nelson in-
volved a case treated as a Title VII action wherein the plaintiff requested that counsel be
appointed for him. Following this demonstration that he was unable to retain private coun-
sel, he was refused counsel by the court.
83. Id.
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was no abuse of discretion by the trial court, but that the standard
requiring a showing of "compelling and meritorious" need for
counsel was too high and therefore a standard requiring only a
showing of a prima facie claim upon which relief could be granted
was appropriate. 4 The court acknowledged no constitutional or
statutory right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, but con-
ceded to the express authority of the district court to appoint
counsel in such proceedings." Refusal of the trial court to appoint
counsel was found not to be an abuse of discretion because of the
crucial fact that after exploring the facts, the trial court found that
had counsel been employed, the conclusion reached at trial would
not have been altered. 6 The court's rejection of the standard of
showing of need employed by the trial court was based on the ra-
tionale that while appointment of counsel should be given serious
consideration by the trial court, a showing of "compelling and mer-
itorious" need was too extreme and that establishing a valid prima
facie claim was more in accord with the purpose of Section 1915(d)
in dismissing frivolous or malicious claims.8 7 Commenting on the
reluctance of judges to request pro bono representation, the court,
citing Peterson v. Nadler,88 expressed confidence that attorneys
would view such appointments as being "integrally within their
professional duty to provide public service." 89 Thus, representation
was held not to be compulsory in Nelson, wherein the appearance
of counsel would have made no difference in the outcome of the
proceedings at trial.9 °
United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land91 involved the issue of
whether the public duty of attorneys to serve without compensa-
tion constituted a taking of property without due process of law
under the Fifth Amendment or involuntary servitude under the
Thirteenth Amendment, and significantly, whether Section 1915(d)
84. Id. at 1004. Only after such prima facie claim is established can further inquiry as
to plaintiff's need for counsel be made. Id.
85. Id. at 1004. See also White v. Walsh, 649 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1981); Peterson v.
Nadler, 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971). The court in Mallard expressly declined to address the
issue of whether federal statutes providing for "assignment" or "appointment" of counsel
authorize federal courts to compel an unwilling attorney to serve. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
86. 728 F.2d at 1006.
87. Id. at 1005.
88. 452 F.2d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 1971).
89. Id. The court also commented on the rarity at that time of lawyers being asked to
serve in civil matters. Id.
90. 728 F.2d at 1005-06.
91. 795 F.2d 796 (1986).
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authorized appointment of counsel to involuntary service in the
form of mandatory assignment.92 The court conceded that the stat-
ute did give courts the authority and discretion to appoint counsel
for indigent civil litigants, and discussed the varied interpretations
of the nature of this power of appointment by different jurisdic-
tions."3 The factors enumerated by the court as being responsible
for such varied interpretation were: federal courts' habitual use of
language of mandatory appointment of counsel without considera-
tion of the appropriateness of such language, the rarity of success-
ful Section 1915(d) motions;94 the rarity of reversal of trial court
denials of counsel because of the broad discretion afforded the trial
court, 5 and the dual employment of the word "appoint" by
courts. 6 The court held that the public duty of an attorney to
serve without compensation when called on constitutes neither a
taking under the Fifth Amendment nor involuntary servitude
under the Thirteenth Amendment, and is a condition of practicing
law.97
The court held that Section 1915(d) did not authorize appoint-
ment of counsel to involuntary service, based upon the plain lan-
92. Id.
93. Id. at 798-800. Among those courts adapting the literal approach, treating
§1915(d) as authorizing only a request by the district court, is the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g.
Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1978). The Eighth Circuit has inter-
preted § 1915(d) more broadly, as requiring counsel to serve without compensation. See,
e.g., Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754,757 (8th Cir. 1971); see also Tyler v. Lark 472 F.2d
1077, 1078-80, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Cir-
cuits use "appointment casually and do not consider the distinction between a request and
an appointment, an approach also adopted by the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Cook v.
Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975); Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15,17 (5th Cir. 1982);
Moss v. Thomas, 299 F.2d 729, 730 (6th Cir. 1962); Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 505
(10th Cir. 1969). Among courts which adopt the approach that "request" and "appoint-
ment" are, in fact, interchangeable are the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g.,
Willett v. Wells, 469 F. Supp. 748, 751, aff'd 595 F.2d 1227 (1979) (mem.); McKeever v.
Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1319 and n.9 (7th Cir. 1982); Knoll v. Socony Mobile Oil Co., 369 F.2d
425, 430 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977 (1967).
94. 795 F.2d at 799. This rarity results from the fact that counsel frr an indigent civil
litigant will only be secured by a district court under "exceptional circumstances." See Al-
dabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980).
95. 795 F.2d 796, 800. Because of the rarity of reversal, nuither the trial nor appellate
courts have much incentive to choose their language carefull,; in ruling on § 1915(d) 11,o-
tions. In such cases, denial of counsel does not turn on construction of the statute. Id.
96. Id. "Appoint" may seem to mean either "to order" an attorney to represent an
indigent client, or "to designate" a pro bono volunteer attorney as counsel of record for such
a client. Id.
97. 795 F.2d at 801. The court noted, however, such appointments may constitute a
grave imposition on the attorney called to serve, and consequently, such appointments are
not compelled lightly by Congress nor by the courts. Id.
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guage of the statute, the lack of provision for payment within the
statute, and the difference in constitutional requirements for ap-
pointment of counsel in civil and criminal actions." Reasoning
that statutes which authorize appointment of counsel generally
utilize the word "assign" or "appoint," that statutes usually pro-
vide for payment of counsel if appointment is intended, and that
there is normally no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case,
the court concluded that Section 1915(d) did not authorize federal
district courts to make mandatory assignments of counsel in civil
proceedings."9
The court in United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land espoused the
Sixth Circuits' position in Reid v. Charney,100 regarding appoint-
ment of counsel, and expressly rejected the Eighth Circuit's ap-
proach in Peterson v. Nadler,'0' observing that the lack of court
authority to make mandatory assignments of counsel would be
compensated by attorneys' recognition of their ethical obligation to
undertake such assistance upon request.'0 2 The 30.64 court con-
cluded that although no mandatory representation was authorized
by Section 1915(d), the motion for counsel in the case before it had
not adequately been considered by the district court, therefore re-
quiring reversal of the denial of counsel and remanding to the dis-
trict court for redetermination.0 3
Unlike the courts in Brooks and 30.64 Acres, the United States
Supreme Court shied away from addressing the coercive appoint-
ment of counsel issue in a Constitutional context. 04 The Mallard
Court, in the majority opinion, viewed the issue as one disposed of
through the employment of general principles of statutory inter-
pretation,'0 5 and did not find it necessary at the time of its deci-
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 235 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1956). Reid held that in a civil case, the court has statutory
power only to request, not assign, representation of the indigent. Id.
101. 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971). Peterson interpreted § 1915(d) as conferring
the express authority of appointment of counsel in civil cases upon the district court. Id.
102. 795 F.2d at 803.
103. Id. at 804.
104. Brooks structured its analysis of compulsory appointment around the implica-
tions of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude; U.S. v.
30.64 Acres incorporated Fifth Amendment and Thirteenth Amendment analyses into its
interpretation of § 1915(d). Cf. Brooks, Civil Action No. 81-G-1303-S (N.D. Alabama S.D.
June 14, 1982) (WL Allfeds library, Dist file); U.S. v. 30.64 Acres, 795 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir.
1986).
105. 109 S. Ct. at 1818. The Court relied on Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471




sion to reach the related issues of the constitutionality of compul-
sory appointment,0 6 the inherent authority of a federal court to
compel such appointment,10 7 the ethical duty accompanying an at-
torney's admission to the bar,' 8 and lack of competence on the
part of the attorney as a sufficient basis for withdrawal. 09
The broad issue of the inherent authority of a federal court to
compel representation of an indigent civil plaintiff was left unde-
cided, 10 as the Court dealt with the more specific issue of whether
Section 1915(d) itself gave a federal court such coercive authority.
Since its analysis was thus transformed into construing a statute,
the Court justifiably employed principles such as plain meaning
and legislative intent in arriving at its conclusion that the opera-
tive term "request" did not confer the authority of coercive ap-
pointment upon the federal courts."'
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. 30.64 Acres, however,
when faced with a similar opportunity to interpret Section 1915(d),
found it appropriate to include a brief acknowledgement of the
Fifth and Thirteenth Amendment issues involved before arriving
at a construction of Section 1915(d) identical to that reached in
Mallard."' Because there was no constitutional challenge raised
below, and because the district court did not invoke its inherent
power in arriving at its decision," 3 the sole issue in Mallard, i.e.,
the meaning of "request" in Section 1915(d), was resolved through
statutory interpretation.""
106. The Thirteenth Amendment constitutional issue was addressed in Brooks, U.S. v.
30.64 Acres, and Sparks; the Fifth Amendment challenge was brought in U.S. v. Dillon, 346
F.2d 633, cert. denied 382 U.S. 978 (1965), and Hurtado v. U.S., 410 U.S. 578 (1973), as well
as U.S. v. 30.64 Acres.
107. 109 S. Ct. at 1823. .. . [nor do we express an opinion on the question whether
the federal courts possess inherent authority to require lawyers to serve." The Court left
this question unaddressed, as inherent authority was not invoked by the District Court's
opinion below. Id.
108. Nelson, 728 F.2d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 1984), expressed confidence that attorneys
would cooperate in shouldering the burden of pro bono appointments, in mere recognition of
their responsibility as professionals. But see U.S. v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965)
for the proposition that pro bono representation of indigents under court order is a condi-
tion under which lawyers are licensed to practice as officers of the court.
109. 57 U.S.L.W. 3611. The question of incompetence as a sufficient basis for with-
drawal was briefly addressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist during oral argument of the case,
however.
110. 109 S. Ct. at 1821, note 8. The issue of inherent authority of coercive appoint-
ment was briefly addressed by the Court in a footnote. Id.
111. 109 S. Ct. at 1823.
112. 795 F.2d at 801.
113. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823.
114. Id. at 1818.
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The court's reliance on the plain meaning of "request" when em-
ployed as a verb, coupled with its analysis of prior and subsequent
federal statutes, justified its conclusion that Section 1915(d)
merely legitimized a federal court's request for an attorney to pro-
vide legal assistance, but in no way authorized the imposition of
sanctions for an attorney's failure to comply.115
In Brooks, the district court found it unnecessary to engage in
such grammatical complexities, as it employed Section 1915(d) as
an example of a non-compulsory appointment statute.11 The court
utilized "appoint" and "request" as the distinction between a stat-
ute which authorized coercive appointment and one which did
not.11 7  •
Because of the dearth of the case history regarding coercive civil
appointments of counsel, the Supreme Court apparently chose to
rely instead on statutory comparisons and to isolate the issue
within this context. Justice Stevens' dissent, however, asserts that
the real issue involved was broader than a mere problem of statu-
tory interpretation; nor was it a matter of deciding which reasons
for declining an appointment would be accepted as sufficient."'
The real issue, according to the dissent, was one of duty, and if
this proposition was correct, then the majority's limitation of the
issue to being one of statutory interpretation was neither a com-
plete nor effective resolution. 1 9
The majority in its conclusion did assert, in dicta, that it in no
way intended that its decision be a denigration of the lawyer's eth-
ical obligation to assist the indigent.120 Justice Kennedy, in his
concurring opinion, likewise gave deference to the concept of law-
yers' obligations to their calling.'
21
115. Id. at 1818-1821. When "request" is given its plain meaning as a verb, in which
case it is not interchangeable with "require" or "demand," it becomes apparent that Con-
gress, although aware of other statutes employing such mandatory language, desired not to
make § 1915(d) an authorization for mandatory service. Id.
116. Brooks, Civil Action No. 81-G-1303-S (N.D. Alabama S.D. June 14, 1982) (WL
Allfeds library, Dist file). The court was comparing § 1915(d) to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1),
which employs the term "appoint."
117. Id.
118. 109 S. Ct. at 1823. Petitioner Mallard's assertion that he lacked competency to
effectively litigate the matter was not addressed by the majority. However, see Sparks at
530-531, involving the assertion by indigent defendants that assigned, underpaid attorneys
would not render effective assistance. The court there addressed the competency issue with
the remark that flexibility among fields of law is the essence of the practice of law, stating
that few cases turn completely upon the skill of the advocate.
119. Id. at 1825.
120. Id. at 1822-23.
121. Id. at 1823. Such obligations, the Justice stated, exceed obligations to the State.
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The dissent, however, apparently saw such dicta as insufficient
in addressing what it viewed as the true issue.12 The dissent's ba-
sis for rejecting the majority's analysis of Section 1915(d) turns on
its refusal to distinguish between "request" and "appoint. ' 128 This
was the approach adopted by the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Cir-
cuits, as discussed in United States v. 30.64 Acres, which catego-
rized the various Circuits' stances regarding this distinction. 1 4
The dissent's inclusion of the surrounding circumstances in its
interpretation of Section 1915(d) suggests that the issue of the in-
herent authority of a federal court to make such appointments has
a direct bearing on the duty of an attorney to serve. As the dissent
reasoned, when a court has established a fair procedure for assign-
ment of counsel, as the District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa had, a formal request made by the court pursuant to that
procedure is "tantamount to a command."'' 2 Because the majority
limited its holding to deciding only that no such coercive authority
existed under Section 1915(d), the broad issues of duty and inher-
ent authority remain left "for another day" by the Court.12
The Mallard Court's specific ruling on Section 1915(d), while
not deciding the general issue of inherent authority of a federal
court to make coercive appointment of counsel, nevertheless ex-
pands the significance of the distinction between statutes which
employ "request" and those which utilize "appoint." The Court's
interpretation of such distinction may lend clarity to courts con-
fronted with the confusion of the varied approaches to interpreta-
tion identified in United States v. 30.64 Acres.'27
In resolving the secondary issue of Mallard's entitlement to the
remedy of a writ of mandamus, the Court employed no novel anal-
ysis nor did it pronounce any elevated standard. It relied on the
traditional use of the writ, which was to "confine an inferior court
to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so."' 28
Id.
122. 109 S. Ct. at 1823. The dissent relied on the Court's recent decision in Barnard v.
Thorstenn, 489 U.S. - (1989) which addressed the issue of duty and discussed a court's
inherent power of appointment as being justified by its authority to define the terms and
conditions of admittance to the bar. Id.
123. Id. at 1825.
124. See supra, note 92 and accompanying text.
125. 109 S. Ct. at 1826.
126. Id. at 1823.
127. See note 92, supra, and accompanying text.
128. 109 S. Ct. at 1822,(citing Roche v. Evaporated Milk Association, 319 U.S. 21, 26
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The dissent incorporated several considerations in its discussion
of the attorney's ethical duty, not without merit. In granting a mo-
tion to withdraw in a case such as Mallard, a balancing of interests
should be employed before the motion is granted." 9 These inter-
ests are that of the court in assuring adequate representation of a
litigant, 30 orderly prosecution of a lawsuit, and those personal in-
terests of the attorney in terminating the client relationship.'
Also to be considered, Justice Stevens noted, were the circum-
stances surrounding the court's "request." If a "fair and detailed"
procedure of appointment has been established by the court, the
"request" is to receive the elevated status of a command.3 2
While the majority's interpretation of Section 1915(d) satisfied
the dispute concerning the meaning of "request" in that statute in
particular, the dissent's incorporation of the broad issue of an at-
torney's ethical duty raises questions which must be addressed on
a subsequent occasion, according to the majority.133 Assuming an
attorney is under such a duty to provide pro bono representation
of an indigent civil plaintiff, how is the duty to be enforced? The
majority in Mallard acknowledged the existence of an ethical duty,
but made no remarks regarding enforcement, presumably because
of their conclusion that such "requests" do not compel an attorney
to mandatory representation."" The dissent, after examining the
circumstances surrounding a court's "request," would find the
court authorized to enforce such a "request" if that court had pre-
viously established a system of appointment."3 5
Thus, the majority's narrow resolution of a single issue involving
the construction of a statute clarifies the previous lack of conform-
ity concerning the interpretation of "request" in appointment stat-
(1943)). The Court also employed the traditional standard of a showing of no adequate al-
ternative means of relief before granting the writ of mandamus. Id.
129. 109 S. Ct. at 1826.
130. See Brooks, Nelson and U.S. v. 30.64 Acres regarding the principle that there is
no constitutional right to counsel for a civil plaintiff. But cf. Powell at 69, which states, "[i]f
in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a
party by counsel . . . such a refusal would be a denial of . . . due process."
131. 109 S. Ct. at 1826.
132. Id.
133. 109 S. Ct. at 1823.
134. Id.
135. 109 S. Ct. at 1826.
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utes. The dissent's dictum regarding the collateral issue of inher-
ent court power lays the groundwork for further discussion of the
question of an attorney's duty, which will surely confront the
Court again at "another day," as Justice Brennan concluded. 86
Catherine L. Lyles
136. 109 S. Ct. at 1823.
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